
Quantitative Easing, Bank Lending, and Macroprudential Regulation

by Andrea Orame, Rodney Ramcharan, and Roberto Robatto

Discussion by Amy Wang Huber MFA March 18, 2023




Conventional monetary policy research



User cost of capital \rightarrow investment

Household borrowing/saving rate → consumption Output, employment

Research on the macro effect of QE




Understanding impact of QE on bank lending is especially relevant in Europe

b) Capital structure of euro area NFCs as of Q3 2020

(percentage of total liabilities)

Source: ECB



In Europe:

- Loan is 7x bond financing.
- Bank loan accounts for

38% of loan financing.


This paper

- <u>Question</u>: How does European banks' accounting of security holdings affect QE-induced bank lending response?
- <u>Approach</u>: Italian supervisory data exploits Khwaja and Mian (2008) twin-exposure identification.
- Key findings: Mark-to-market accounting delivers more impact.
- **Discussion plan:** Magnitude.
 - Connection to literature.
 - Estimation strategy.
 - Back-of-the-envelope, a revisit.

QE on banks: what we know

- Bank lending responds to QE, magnitude depends on exposure to purchased asset: e.g., Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017).
 - This paper: banks' exposure depends on accounting measurement.
- Basel III's removal of historical cost accounting (AOCI filter) exposes banks to market fluctuation, affecting banks' funding, loan supply, reporting incentives, etc: e.g., Kim, Kim, Ryan (2019), Bischof, Laux, Leuz (2021).
 - This paper: links exposure to loan response following <u>QE</u>.
- \rightarrow What would be good to establish: magnitude.
 - Necessary to balance the impact of mark-to-market on QE response with other supervisory concerns.

Estimation strategy and result



- Point estimate: difference in month-over-month loan growth of the same firm borrowing from high-exposure bank vs. low-exposure bank.
- "Exposure": share of mark-to-market security holdings in the month before QE announcement.

Observation on the result

The month following the announcement is the only month that has a significant jump in loan growth.

- If QE relaxed banks' regulatory constraint, why did banks only favor firms who applied for loans in the immediate next month?
 - Could it be that banks anticipated QE and asked firms to delay application?
- Current "anticipation test" only looks at whether banks shifted their securities portfolio ahead of QE.
- Why not use average loan growth in the preceding six (6) months as the baseline to circumvent possible anticipation?

Magnitude of impact

Total effect = amount of loan * additional loan growth

- = mean loan amount * # of firms *
 estimated additional effect per unit of exposure * exposure
- = €533K * 846K * 0.248 * 6%
- =€6.7B
- \approx 13K new loans

Magnitude of impact

	Paper	Alternative 1	Alternative 2	
Number of firms in sample	846K	846K	846K	
Mean loan amount	€533K	€533K	€533K	
Estimated additional effect	0.248	0.248	0.148	Seasonally adjusted
Exposure (banks' eligible security)	6%	6%	6%	
		1 in 12	1 in 12	Month in year with effect
Total effect	€6.7B	€0.6B	€0.3B	
Additional loans	13K	1K	626	Less than 0.1% of firms benefit?

Conclusion

- Important question to study.
- Contribution could lie in precisely quantifying the impact.
- Good luck!

