

EVERGREEN LENDING IN TIMES OF CRISIS
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SUMMARY


- Timely paper on an important question:
 - What is the role played by financial intermediaries in policy implementation?
- Findings:
 - Documents more lending by banks to relationship borrowers compared to transactional borrowers.
 - Argues that banks are motivated by a desire to subsidize existing loans.
- Discussion plan:
 - Revisit potential mechanisms and policy implications.

MECHANISM – THIS PAPER

- Why did banks lend more to “relationship borrowers”?
- This paper: banks want to lower risk of default on pre-crisis debt.
 - Evidence 1: differential effect in deposit vs. lending accounts.
 - Deposit account provides limited insight into a firm’s ability to pay debt.
 - If anything, this supports the view that asymmetric info plays a role.
 - Evidence 2: comparison between PPP and matched non-PPP firms.
 - PPP firms are selected into treatment, difficult to find a convincing match.
 - Irrespective, ex-post default reveals little about ex-ante decision.
- What could be helpful:
 - Within-bank, cross-sectional comparison based on cost of default.
 - Proxy 1: share of lending bank in firm’s total debt.
 - Proxy 2: firm’s distance to default.

MECHANISM – ALTERNATIVES?

- Possibility: extending loan to relationship firms is less costly.



- “... costs [banks] incurred to make the program work [include] all-nighters and rushed technology projects during four frenzied months of lockdowns and business closures.”
- Banks still need to do due diligence, especially because banks are wary that loan forgiveness may not materialize as payment from SBA is contingent on meeting stringent timeline requirements.
- Possible test: second round of funding became available end of April but amendment of loan forgiveness terms came at end of May – does relationship play a differential role before and after the amendment?


POLICY IMPLICATION

- Better / more clearly written policy solves the problem?
- What's the trade-off between larger loans vs. smaller loans is also central to the policy debate.
 - Cutoffs in the fee schedule could be useful for identification.

A tiny fraction of high-value loans made up a substantial portion of total P.P.P. money handed out

Share of loans distributed, by amount

100% of loans




92% of loans were \$250,000 or smaller.

Only about 1% of loans were over \$1.5 million.

Share of money distributed, by loan amount

100% of money distributed



Loans over \$1.5 million made up **over 25%** of the total amount given out.

Note: The largest possible amount a business can be loaned via the Paycheck Protection Program is \$10 million. - Source: Small Business Administration

CONCLUSION

- Important question!
- More analyses on the mechanism can shed better light on the economic trade-off.
- Good luck!