

THE PERSISTENT WIDENING OF CROSS-CURRENCY BASIS: WHEN INCREASED FX SWAP DEMAND MEETS LIMITS OF ARBITRAGE

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May 3, 2023

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
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⇒ intermediaries matter for asset pricing.
 - Construct a profitable trading strategy.
 - Quantify the price on the risk that intermediaries' constraint tightens.
 - Demonstrate that this risk is priced across asset classes.
- Outstanding question: quantify supply vs. demand in driving CIP deviations.
 - If mostly driven by customer demand and not intermediary supply, then CIP deviations capture more FX-specific dynamics.

CIP DEVIATIONS CORRELATE WITH SEVEN NEAR-ARBITRAGES



Other arbitrages: bond-CDS basis, CDS-CDX basis, USD libor tenor basis, 30Y swap spread, Refco-Treasury spread, KfW-Bund spread, asset-swapped TIPS/Treasury spread.

THIS PAPER

- Leverages FX transaction data from Israeli' Institutional Investors (II).
- Employs *Granular Instrumental Variable* (GIV) to isolate demand shocks.
- Traces the impact on USD-ILS CIP basis from IIs' demand shocks.
 - Demand shocks have significant impact when *intermediaries are constrained*.
- Discussion plan:
 - How is the effect estimated?
 - GIV
 - Constraint
 - What would we like to estimate?

GRANULAR IV

Problem:

- Total demand: $D_{it} = \bar{Q}S_i(1 + y_{it})$; y_{it} is a demand shift term.
- But $y_{it} = \phi^d p_t + \lambda_i \eta_t + u_{it}$, and we only want u_{it} .

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Solution by [Gabaix and Koijen \(2023\)](#):

- Define instrument $z_t := y_{\Gamma t} = y_{St} - y_{Et} = u_{St} - u_{Et}$.
- Key: subtracting off equal-weighted individual demand from share-weighted individual demand removes the common shock, η_t .


AUTHORS' APPROACH

- Control for lagged individual II's demand and a host of common shocks, in the hope that the residual will be idiosyncratic (u_{it}).
- But this is not fool-proof:
 - Controlled for equity returns in US vs. Israel, but what about long term bonds?
 - Controlled for broad dollar index, but what about shekel's exchange rate?
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 - Controlled for VIX, but what about constitutional change in Israel?
- Suggestion: follow the original construction for GIV.
- N.B.: GIV is not valid if idiosyncratic shocks are correlated with II size, $\mathbf{E}[\epsilon_t u_{it} | i \in Small] \neq \mathbf{E}[\epsilon_t u_{it} | i \in Large] \neq 0$, where ϵ_t is the common shock to supply.
 - At the same time, if all the IIs are of the same size, then $u_{St} = u_{Et}$ and GIV has no power.
 - Need better justification for the application of GIV.

INTERMEDIARY'S CONSTRAINT MATTERS




Classic message: the same shift in demand has a bigger price impact when supply is more inelastic.

Implicit assumption: when intermediaries are constrained, their supply becomes more inelastic.

MEASURE INTERMEDIARY'S LIMIT OF ARBITRAGE

- Authors' choice: [He, Kelly, and Manela \(2017\)](#)'s capital ratio.
 - $\text{CapRatio} = \text{market cap} / (\text{market cap} + \text{book debt})$.
- What is HKM's CapRatio capturing?
 - Book debt tends to be very stable. CapRatio therefore captures mostly variations in market cap.
- Potential concerns:
 - Market cap reflects, in part, equity-specific dynamics not shared by other markets such as FX, CDS, options (HKM).
 - Market cap naturally reflects *intermediary wealth*, which is correlated with — but not the same as — the regulatory constraint that matters for CIP deviations / supply of dollar funding.

WEALTH VS. REGULATORY CONSTRAINT: NEGATIVE CORRELATION POST-GFC



WEALTH DOESN'T PRICE THE RISK OF CONSTRAINT

Table 6
Pricing Fwd CIP returns with intermediary wealth

	One-month fwd 3-month classic pc forward CIP returns						
	Monthly returns				Quarterly returns		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Market		0.011* (0.006)		0.009 (0.009)	0.006 (0.008)		0.020*** (0.006)
Int. equity			0.007** (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)			
HKM factor					0.004 (0.003)		
AEM factor							0.0001 (0.0001)
Constant	0.050*** (0.010)	0.036*** (0.010)	0.045*** (0.009)	0.037*** (0.011)	0.041*** (0.011)	0.150*** (0.032)	0.079** (0.034)
Observations	126	126	126	126	126	42	42

In this table, we regress the returns of the “Top-six first PC” forward CIP trading portfolio on a constant and the intermediary wealth and constraint proxies described in the text: Market, Intermediary Equity, the HKM Factor, and the AEM factor. Regressions (1) through (4) use monthly returns. Regressions (5) and (6) use quarterly returns. Standard errors are computed using the Newey-West kernel with a 12-month (monthly) or four-quarter (quarterly) bandwidth. * $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

WHAT IS MEASURED AND WHAT WOULD BE GOOD TO MEASURE?

- Using demand shocks isolated from *GIV*, the authors run impulse response of II demand shock on CIP deviations for two regimes of intermediary constraints, as measured by *HKM's CapRatio*.
 - Regime 1: constraint at average value.
 - Regime 2: constraint at 96+ percentile.
- What can we say about the relative force of supply vs. demand in creating CIP deviations?
- Suggestion: run estimations for more regimes.

CONCLUSION

- CIP deviation holds the key to understanding asset pricing dynamics post-GFC.
- An important question is to quantify the relative contribution of supply vs. demand in CIP deviation.
- Good luck!

- Du, W., B. Hébert, and A. W. Huber. 2022. Are intermediary constraints priced? Review of Financial Studies .
- Du, W., A. Tepper, and A. Verdelhan. 2018. Deviations from covered interest rate parity. Journal of Finance 73:915–57.
- Gabaix, X., and R. S. J. Koijen. 2023. Granular instrumental variables. Working Paper.
- He, Z., B. Kelly, and A. Manela. 2017. Intermediary asset pricing: New evidence from many asset classes. Journal of Financial Economics 126:1–35.